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BOOK REVIEW
Commercial Transactions: Cases, Text and Problems on Contracts
Dealing with Personalty, Realty and Services. By Ellen Ash Peters.'
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1971. pp. lix, 1451. $17.50.
The title alone of Professor Peters' addition to the five-foot shelf
of Commercial Law casebooks raises an interesting issue: does the
rubric "Commercial Transactions" ideally comprise the bulk of con-
tractual transactions in personalty, realty and services? Beyond the
inclusion of a few core topics, there seems to be little professional
agreement on exactly what is encompassed, even among those of us
who teach the course. 2 In reviewing these new materials, then, I should
like to begin by setting out a few cursory hypotheses concerning the
teaching of commercial law, and some notions about what good
teaching materials might contain. By applying these as criteria, an
evaluation of the suitability of the Peters book will then be essayed.'
I. OBJECTIVES AND MATERIALS IN THE COMMERCIAL COURSES
A. Classroom Objectives
The range of topics to be included within any curricular offering'
depends, of course, on the defined educational objective.' The commer-
cial law novice normally comes to the course with some academic
training in Contracts, and often Property as well. Starting there, the
function of the course in Commercial Law should be to further the
1 Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
2 Reference is made to the curricular announcements of the various law schools. A
relatively large sampling of the 1970-71 bulletins shows that the semester hours devoted
to courses arguably within the ambit of "Commercial Transactions" varies from four to
over fifteen; the descriptions run from "A Study of the Uniform Commercial Code" to
enviable long paragraphs of included topics. Products Liability is rarely excised for
separate course treatment; "consumerism" is somewhat oftener. While it is difficult to
glean from this literature whether realty mortgages and land finance are covered more in
the basic property courses than elsewhere, it is unlikely that a four or six semester-hour
course in Commercial Transactions described as a study of various articles of the U.C.C.
includes an integration of those or similar matters.
A more comprehensive survey appears in Del Duca, Continuing Evaluation of Law
School Curricula—An Initial Survey, 20 J. Legal Ed. 309, 317-33 (1968), but without
detailed descriptions of course contents.
8 Such an approach is intended to avoid the pitfalls discussed in Parker, A Field Guide
to Book Reviewing, 20 J. Legal Ed. 169 (1968).
4 My concern here is primarily with the choices of included topics and their pre-
sentation within teaching materials, rather than with the more protracted issues of cur-
ricular attitude. For discussions of the latter sec, for example, Note, Legal Theory and
Legal Education, 79 Yale L.J. 1153 (1970); Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal
Education, 79 Yale L.J. 444 (1970).
6 Since the criteria for inclusion and exclusion may thus vary significantly, the pur-
pose of the classification must be kept in mind. What the statutes or digests may lump
together may—for purposes of instruction—best be considered asunder: "There may well
be a distinction between classification for a code, for practical treatises, for academic in-
struction, and for a treatise on jurisprudence." 5 R. Pound, Jurisprudence 72 (1959).
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development of the student's ability to anticipate, recognize, and
resolve the legal problems relative to the distribution of goods and
services in the American economy. This suggests at least some irre-
ducible elements: Sales, Security, Distribution and Payment.
A further qualification, dictated by such practical matters as
available time, is that of generality. To avoid engulfing an entire
curriculum with this one course or sequence of courses, special prob-
lems of regulated or concentrated industries must be afforded separate
elective treatment to the extent that they do not partake of the legal
elements common to the bulk of commercial enterprises. For similar
reasons, questions involving the form of business organization may
be excised, except as they may be dictated by (or may dictate) the
manner of executing the commercial purposes of the firm. A few ex-
ceptions do exist to the general rule that problems relating to distribu-
tion of goods and services are not significantly altered by the choice of
incorporation over proprietorship or partnership. In short, the course
should include discussion of primarily the private law° aspects of Sales,
Security, Payment and Distribution of goods and services.?
Viewing these subjects in their component parts gives the follow-
ing list:
(1) Sales: Creation, performance and remedies for breach
of the contract of sale; quality and delivery require-
ments.
(2) Security: Security interests in personal property;
suretyship; remedies in bankruptcy; unsecured credit;
reclamation of goods; realty security as a production
financing device.
(3) Payment: Negotiable Instruments, Bank Collections
's The private versus public law choice has been noted elsewhere: MacLachlan,
Commercial Law As an Academic Subject, 66 Corn, L. J. 69, 69-70 (1961). MacLachlan's
point of view, however, if taken to its extreme, ignores important facets of the final step
in the distributive chain—the consumer. Public law here looms large.
7 Or, primarily Articles 2 (Sales), 3 (Commercial Paper), 7 (Documents of Title),
and 9 (Secured Transactions) of the Uniform Commercial Code. [hereinafter, U.C.C.
citations are to sections of the 1962 uniform text.) That this is true is hardly surprising:
"[Tlhis code . . . attempts to collect in one place most of the legal rules regulating the
sale and distribution of goods and the collection of the price. . . ." Dunham, The New
Commercial Code (remarks delivered to the Commercial Law League of America), 55
Com. L. J. 197 (1950).
In fairness, Pound's caveat bears citing:
In particular, it would be most unfortunate to set up a category of commercial
law in a classification of the common law. Such may be one effect of the Uni-
form Commercial Code . . , In such a course there is likely to be consolidated
what had been taught as distinct courses in one heterogeneous artificial
course • ... [The U.C.C.) cuts across many subjects in the law, with no common
principle to hold the selected revered [sic] parts together.
5 R, Pound, supra note 5, at 73-74, 74 n.109. Pound's classificatory criteria look to
history, tradition, logic and analogy but they do not include professional utility or
frequency and degree of interaction among severable topics. Cf. Friedman, Contract Law
and Contract Research, 20 J. Legal Ed. 452-53 (1968),
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and Deposits; Letters of Credit; Credit Cards; Con-
sumer Credit.
(4) Distribution: Documents of Title; Contracts of Car-
riage and of Bailment; Franchise Agreements; Distrib-
utorships and Dealerships.
Additionally, brief excursions into agency, 8 commercial insur-
ance,° and corporate finance may be undertaken when necessary to
amplify the central headings, or at least to remind the student that
"Commercial Law" is often only a part of effective business counsel-
ing. Selected topics in bankruptcy and consumer credit, both of which
are often taught in separate courses, must also be introduced: the
former for the simple reason that no discussion of security is sensible
without a consideration of its durability in insolvency proceedings; 11
the latter because of its astounding growth, size, and importance.' 2
While the treatment of these related matters could vary sub-
stantially, the course should not be lured into the comfortable trap
of focusing exclusively on the Uniform Commercial Code. The U.C.C.
—as compared to certain of the commercial codes of the civilian tradi-
tion—"is at best only a partial and limited codification."' Even some
areas within the Code's ostensible jurisdiction are often governed by
preemptive federal legislation," or by reference to extra-Code statutes
and decisions.n
See U.C.C. § 1-103: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act .. .
the law relative to ... principal and agent . . . shall supplement its provisions." See also
§§ 3-403, 4-201.
9 For example, see U.C.C. § 2-510(2),(3) (location of "Risk of Loss").
10 Students and instructors of Commercial Law (although perhaps not practicing
lawyers) have, in my view, traditionally ignored the extent to which financing decisions
(buying on credit, factoring accounts receivable, issuing short term promissory notes, or
drawing on secured lines of credit) can affect the financial structure of the firm, and
hence its profitability to the owners, as well as its position in the capital markets. While
I do not suggest that a tour de force in corporate finance be given with every course
in commercial law, this is one point at which some awareness of the interdependence of
the two "disciplines" would be helpful.
11 MacLachlan, supra note 6, at 72.
12 While Braucher predicts that consumer credit law will disappear from the com-
mercial law curriculum—as, he says, did Products Liability from Torts—to become a part
of public law studies, Warren disagrees. In Warren's view, enactment of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968 (15 U.S.C. § 1671-77 (1970)) and of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code will make the study of a "national" consumer credit law more facile
within the commercial law courses. See Roundtable on Commercial Law, 22 J. Legal Ed.
331, 336, 337-38 (1970). See also the remarks, of Egon Guttman. Id. at 357. Whether
or not Consumer Credit is given separate course treatment, the status of "consumerism"
does deserve mention at any point in the Commercial Law courses where it is signifi-
cantly different in legal effect from the merchant-to-merchant nexus.
12 Remarks of Professor Rodolfo Batiza, Roundtable on Commercial Law, 22 J.
Legal Ed. 331, 347 (1970).
14 For example, the Federal Bills of Lading Act, 49 U.S.C. § 81-124 (1970); Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (1970); Federal Tax Lien Statutes, Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 6321-6323; National Validation of Security Interests in Motor Carriers, 49
U.S.C. § 313 (1970); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499 (1970).
15 For example, U.C.C. § 2-402(2) ("fraudulent under any rule of law"), 9-310
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Whatever topics are chosen, imparting doctrinal expertise in a
second- or third-year law school class is never sufficient, and usually
not possible, without simultaneously educating the class in legal
method. Memorization of rule, counterrule, and exception without an
appreciation of the system in which the rules operate, and of the policy
referents which dictate choices among competing alternatives, does
not equip the student to counsel effectively the commercial client's
affairs. Lawyering involves the making of vital choices and predictions.
The student who sees law not as process but as a collection of rules
will be ill-equipped to act when goods must be moved and no "horn-
book" formula exactly fits." At such a point, a reasoned and realistic
analysis of the alternative courses of action, and a prediction about
their outcomes, must be made—often with little time to search through
even scant precedent.
In Commerical Law, even the usual tools of legal analysis are
often not enough. Typically, the student is for the first time being
exposed to a field of law largely statutory in its coverage and, what is
worse, to a code. The legal method of the Anglo-American common
law has, in some very important respects, been displaced by the "Lex
Llewellyn,"" not only by the particular characteristics's of the U.C.C.,
but by the very nature of a code:
A "code" is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive
enactment of a whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that
it displaces all other law in its subject area save only that
which the code excepts. It is systematic in that all of its
parts, arranged in an orderly fashion and stated with a con-
sistent terminology, form an interlocking, integrated body
revealing its own plan and containing its own methodology.
("unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise"), 9-201(1)
("subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule . . ."). Compare
also §§ 7-103, 1-103.
10 Vold, Construing the Uniform Commercial Code: Its Own Twin Keys: Uniformity
and Growth, 50 Cornell L.Q. 49, 56 (1964). Vold impliedly considers an appreciation of
legal systems to be essential to commercial Iawyering: "[To find the applicable rule]
under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code .. . choose the provision (or
interpretation based thereon) deemed most likely to achieve the purpose (or redress the
mischief) toward which that provision of the Uniform Commercial Code was aimed. . . .
Will this decision as a precedent help the useful process of . . moving] goods from
original maker to final user? If so, this decision will prima facie tend toward greatest
fulfillment of human wants with least practicable frustration of other human wants . ..."
Id.
Even the lawyer who does know his way around the commercial law "rules" can stub
his toe very painfully when he takes, e.g., one section of the U.C.C. at purely face value.
See pp. 196-98 infra, on Code methodology. Such slips are, unfortunately, occasionally
made by the bench as well as the bar. See National Shawmut Bank v. International
Yarn Corp., 322 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
17 Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 330, 333 (1951).
18 Or, unforgivable idiosyncrasies. See Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185 (1967).
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It is comprehensive in that it is sufficiently inclusive and
independent to enable it to be administered in accordance
with its own basic policies."
While the U.C.C. does not partake of this definition to the
extent of being an entirely closed system, it does have its intrinsic
methodology." The use of case precedent in problems of Code inter-
pretation differs from that in strictly common law controversies. Large
areas are indeed left to case law evolution," but, generally speaking,
the interstices in any given U.C.C. provision should not be filled
exclusively by resorting to principles enshrined in the cases." The
Code's own purposes, rather than just the accumulated wisdom of
prior opinions, should be the primary source of guidance." Partially
because the U.C.C. was drafted in response to the obsolescence (by
changed business practices, in many instances) of prior law," "so far
as possible the meaning of the law [should] be gathered from the
[U.C.C.] itself, unfettered by anachronisms indigenous to the respec-
tive jurisdictions. . . .""
Furthermore, the U.C.C. contains its own "gap-fillers 12 "--residual
19, Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. 111. L.F. 291
(1962) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Hawkland]. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1), (2).
20 Hawkland, supra note 19, at 313-20.
21 For example, U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2: "the warranty sections of this Article
are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have
recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the
direct parties to such a contract. . . ." Section 1-103 states: "Unless displaced by the
particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity , . • shall supplement its
provisions."
22 U.C.C. 1-102, Comment 1: "It is intended to make it possible for the law em-
bodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new
circumstances and practices. However . • Wile Act should be construed in accordance
with its underlying purposes and policies, The text of each section should be read in the
light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question .. • ."
But see cases at note 25, and discussion of the commercial context at pp. 198-99 infra.
23 See Hawkland, Article 9 Methodology, 9 Wayne L. Rev. 531, 534 (1963), 1 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 815, 819. It is, of course, unwise to be categorical about such a proposition.
As Mueller has pointed out, a law teacher, to be useful, must be a legal realist as well
as a legal philosopher. Discussions of what courts do should not be omitted for the sake
of elucidating what they should do. See Mueller, Contract Remedies, Business Facts and
Legal Fantasy, 20 J. Legal Ed. 469, 471 (1968). See also cases at note 25, infra.
24 Luther, The Commercial Code—What and Why, 36 Mass. L,Q. 24 (1951).
25 Lincoln Bond & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1961). Un-
fortunately, not all jurisdictions accept such a clean beginning. "[T]he Massachusetts
court regards (the Codel less as a novel enactment than as largely a restatement and
clarification of existing law . . . ." Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank &
Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790, 792 (D. Mass. 1958). Other courts allow a mixture—the
Code is exclusive, but prior cases not inconsistent with its provisions are controlling.
Herington Livestock Auction Co. v. Verschoor, 179 N.W.2d 491, 495, — Iowa —
(1970). Cf. also In re Robertson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 266, 269 (Bankruptcy No. 26,
299, E.D. Tenn. 1969) with General Electric Credit Corp. v. R.A. Heintz Constr. Co.,
302 F. Supp. 958, 963-964 (D. Ore. 1969).
20	 § 1-102(1), (2), 1-106. Cf. Vold, supra note 16, at 62 and Hawkland,
supra note 19, at 30.3.
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sections designed to avoid the academic unreality that any seemingly
closed system invites." To use such provisions properly is to under-
stand the Code's internal methods of definition and qualification: it is
not so much a function of doctrinal knowledge as it is of the techniques
of search and synthesis.
Even these cursory observations on the internal method of the
U.C.C. have significant implications for the choice of materials best
used in the Commercial Law classroom. A series of cases, for example,
illustrating the evolution of some concept over time may yet be
necessary to demonstrate the historical dimensions of a given point,
but it is no longer adequate to stop with the most recent decision on
the subject. Teaching materials should be constructed so as to reveal
history, evolution2s and doctrine, as well as to present opportunities
for exercising the methodological skills peculiar to, and necessary for,
adequate facility with commercial law problems.
The teaching materials for commercial law must also convey to the
student, if not a description of contemporary commercial practices,
at least an awareness of the extreme importance of the business con-
text. This is so for several reasons. First, devices such as after-acquired
property financing, field warehousing and other like esoteric be-
haviors, as well as commercial documents such as letters of credit,
trade acceptances, and bills of lading, cannot be appreciated—and the
law relative to them understood—unless they are introduced with
some explanation of their commercial utility. Second, appreciation
of the "demonstrable realities" of a transaction is crucial to the
resolution of commercial disputes" even in nonlitigious arenas. Finally,
the U.C.C. eschews "solving puzzles in dead languages," but instead
seeks to reinstate the merchant as the main arbiter of
commercial law; its golden age is the age of Lord Mansfield
and his merchantmen juries... .
Without a formal panel of merchants, the Code none-
theless insists that objectified commercial practice is the
norm of decision in commercial cases [; ] the judge acts as a
wise, open-minded arbiter, and sifter of the evidence on
custom."
27 Hawkland refers to the following as "supereminent provisions": U.C.C. §§ 1-203,
1-204, 2-302, 2-716(1), 3-511(1), 4-103(2), 8-406, 9-207. Hawkland, supra note 19, at
305.
28 See, MacLachlan, supra note 6, at 71: "[The Code] can be best understood only
in its background. . . . [T]reating the Code as if it came from another planet on some
date in the 1950's is complete nonsense."
29 Peters, Remedies For Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Road Map for Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199, 201-02
(1963).
so Friedman, Contract Law and Contract Research, Part I, 20 J. Legal Ed. 452,
456 (1968). Compare Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1962 U. III. L.F. 321, 331, with Countryman, Commercial Law, 47
Texas L. Rev. 1003-04 (1969). The latter (quoting J. Frank, American Law: The Case for
Radical Reform (1968), as to § 2-302) states: "[T]here may be arguments for or
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The commercial lawyer in his role of planner, problem solver
and advocate must be acutely aware of business contexts" and prac-
tices; and the commercial law teacher must carefully select his mate-
rials to serve this need. 32
B. Materials: Cases, Problems and Text
The actual selection of materials is much more difficult than
loosely describing the criteria for inclusion or exclusion, partially be-
cause varying pedagogical attitudes are more comfortably linked with
disparate types of materials. Nevertheless, certain parameters are
apparent.
against a contract provision which arises from the facts of the trade of which the court,
unless instructed, would be ignorant."
31 Most notable among U.C.C. sections which incorporate such factors is § 1-205:
Section 1-205. Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing
a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence
and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that
such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the inter-
pretation of the writing is for the court.
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vo-
cation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be
aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agree-
ment.
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing
or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both
course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of
trade.
(5) An applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of per-
formance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to that part
of the performance.
(6) Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is not ad-
missible unless and until he has given the other party such notice as the court
finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise to the latter.
The potential utility to the lawyer of such a provision is difficult to overemphasize. One
excellent analysis is that by Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. Llewellyn is
the Hero of the Piece; Or Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling
Cathedral, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 139 (1970).
The U.C.C. literally abounds with similar opportunities. See, for example, §§ 2-609
(1), (2), 3-304(1)(a), inter alia.
32 There is at least a fourth reason, i.e., that commercial disputes are very frequently
settled without reference to the contract or to potential or actual legal sanctions. Macauly,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Amer. Soc. Rev. 55,
61 (1963). Note also the colloquy between Morris and Kevin in Leff, Injury, Ignorance
and Spite—The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 Yale L.J. 1, 25-26 (1970).
This lack of reliance on contract law in the behavior of commercial men exists at
the planning stage as well as the resolution stage. Sec Macauly, supra, at 57-58, 61,
63-66.
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For several reasons some introductory text on commercial prac-
tices, including prototypal transactions and sample forms of com-
mercial documents, is highly desirable. 33
 In many areas of contem-
porary commercial law, especially some within the peculiar ambit
of the U.C.C., reported opinions of adequate significance and lucidity
are less than abundant. Even though U.C.C. methodology can very
often be well explored by running a pre-Code case through the Code's
"plumbing," some balance between historical perspective and contem-
porary practice must be struck. The Code's reliance on actual business
practices as the norm demands a familiarity from students often
not possible to attain solely from a study of available appellate opin-
ions. First, an appellate case is an extraordinary event in nonconsumer
commerce, and to a lesser extent, in consumer affairs as well. It is
atypical, often the result of a deviation from established practices.
Second, and to the extent to which such materials can be used to
extrapolate present commercial behavior, the vintage must be carefully
controlled.
Exclusive reliance on cases—in the classroom if not in the pre-
pared materials—poses other dangers as well. In this field of law
especially, effective counseling (as well as drafting, negotiating and
arbitrating) requires that the attorney be aware of the reality that
"commercial law" problems often include significant nonlegal or
quasi-legal factors.34 The usual case method often insulates the student
from this awareness. In addition, while the relative instructional em-
phasis between the questions "What-should-the-lawyer-do," and
"What-should-the-court-hold" is a largely personal matter, the straight
appellate case method alone seems inefficient to pursue the former
very far."
Retaining the case method as the core of legal education in this
field as well as others, however, does have its advantages:
The student keeps his feet on the ground, distrusts
33 In response to those who may think that extensive note materials make learning
too easy, I can do no better than quote the following: "Motes try to do a job similar
to that of Sherpa bearers in an Everest expedition; good help at the outset merely gets
one more quickly to the toughest parts of the climb." J. Honnold, Law of Sales and
Sales Financing xii (3d ed. 1967). Compare also Davis' view that "(Me notion that
textwriting is not for training the mind but is only for informing the mind is a mis-
understanding, and a thoroughly pernicious one." Davis, The Text-Problem Form of the
Case Method as a Means of Mind Training for Advanced Law Students, 12 J. Legal Ed.
543, 545 (1960). (Reprinted from K. Davis, Administrative Law Cases, Text and Prob-
lems (1960).1
84 Yegge, The Future Legal Practitioner in the United States: What Training He
Must Receive (AALS Curriculum Committee Proceedings, 1967), 44 Deny. L.J. 12, 21-
22 (1967).
85 Davis, supra note 33, at 545. In Davis' view, the straight case method examines
law in the context of the appeal—it tends to be critical (and thus negative), seldom cre-
ative (and thus affirmative), and its focus is narrowing, rather than broadening. Id. at
546. In addition, its focus has its good and bad points.
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generalizations and abstractions, appreciates the importance
of application of principle, considers facts of cases as well
as ideas and problems, participates in thinking that contrib-
utes to solutions, and prepares his own generalizations. . . ."
Ideally, a set of prepared teaching materials should include various
types of material, each with its purpose. Doctrine, methods, policy,
history and process are each best illustrated and learned in differing
fashions. Monolithic materials often cannot avoid elevating one at the
expense of another.
C. Organization
Beyond considerations of the types of teaching materials, but at
least of equal importance, is the ordering of the constellation of topics
included within the course(s) in Commercial Law." Few instructors,
I suspect, are immune to nagging questions such as: "Why (not) a
separate course in Negotiable Instruments?" Such inquiries (or self-
doubts) refer not only to the selection of topics covered within any
discrete "course," but also, interdependently, to the relationships
among the included subjects. The former is dictated most commonly by
curricular pressures," although there is little uniformity among the
several law schools as to where the suggested topics are to be placed
in the curriculum." The latter may be the area wherein the individual
instructor typically has the widest latitude.
Total separation of Sales, Security, Distribution and Payment—
which is how it used to be in the "Old Days," I am told—seems to
me a patently bad idea. Presenting "a series of unrelated flashes of
brilliance" is, according to Gilmore," equivalent to treating "[e]ach
new case or group of cases [as] a surprise package whose relationship
to what went before and came after ... [is] an impenetrable mystery."
On the other hand, totally integrating all the diversified parts of the
system fails to give the student any point of beginning; a spiral is
always easier to approach than a series of increasingly larger con-
centric circles.
One integration pattern which appears, on balance, to have much
in its favor is termed "transaction-oriented." Not only does it provide
the context into which the various elements may be positioned and
appreciated, it also tends to bridge the gap from academic aridity to
30 Davis, supra note 33, at 543-44.
87 See list at pp. 194-95 supra.
38 An adequate package, I think, is one similar to that in effect at the University of
Toledo: Introduction to Commercial Law (4 quarter hours); Advanced Commercial
Transaction I (3 hours); and Advanced Commercial Transactions II (3 hours). Or, as
one of my colleagues would have it: "Simple Transactions," "Difficult Transactions," and
"Incredible Transactions."
88 See note 2 supra.
40 As quoted in the majority preface in R. Speidel, R. Summers and J. White,
Commercial Transactions xii (1969).
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a more nearly satisfactory balance of the philosophical and the prac-
tical, simply by always having available a ground upon which feet
can from time to time be placed. 4 ' Beginning with the sale, or more
precisely, with the formation of the sale contract, the transaction
orientation flows smoothly through analysis of the parties' respective
obligations toward each other (including those of quality and delivery),
into the schemes for remedying the breach of one or more of them, and
on to the mechanisms for distribution. Problems in financing (both
production'2
 and purchase) and in payment (instruments, documents,
bank collection systems) complete the analysis of the flow of goods
(and services) and the counterfiow of payments.
Problems in melding the subject areas arise, however, when two
or more sorts of devices are operating simultaneously. Students have,
for example, avoidable difficulty in appreciating transactions involving
"sight draft against bill of lading" if they begin discussing documents
of title without some prior understanding of negotiable instruments.
Similarly, field warehousing, or any similar type of commodity paper
financing, partakes of Documents and of Security simultaneously 43
An extended digression into, say, all of Article 7 or Article 3 for the
sole purpose of rounding out a discussion of the Article 2 obligations
is enormously disruptive in the transaction-context course, yet some
mention of interaction is mandatory. Here the selection of materials
may be crucial. A case or two on negotiability—or perhaps a bit of
well written text—inserted into the Sales materials at the proper time
may do much to illuminate the relationship among the topics in a
thoroughly realistic way, and still save other commercial paper prob-
lems for treatment at a more propitious time. In response to the
question concerning where in the commercial law course Article 3 is
covered, the answer might well be: "Wherever relevant.""
41 The idea is hardly new, at least from this writer's vantage point. See generally
Shestack, Another Look at Commercial Law Instruction, 2 J. Legal Ed. 466 (1950).
42 "Financing production" is the one element most amenable to separate treatment,
either as a major digression from security (including suretyship) in general, or later on,
when it can be combined with financing through the issuance of various types of money
and commodity paper, and—depending upon curricular pressures—with the uses of real
estate security. But any point at which it becomes relevant is the point at which a fleeting
excursion into corporate finance should be taken, if for no other reason than to assist
the student in simultaneously integrating several major fields in his own mind during his
student career.
43 A similar problem exists, although far more readily soluble, in overlapping con-
cepts. The indicia of negotiability and its consequences may vary from Article 3 to
Article 7, but there are enough similarities to make severing the common elements
worthwhile.
44 The retort is intended to be exemplary only; it is not limited to Article 3, al-
though that body of law is more apparently susceptible to such treatment than some
others. While it is also true that Negotiable Instruments is a "code within a code," it is





In using the foregoing thoughts as criteria by which to evaluate
Professor Peters' new offering, the following caveat should perhaps be
noted. It is quite tenable to assert that a casebook is a resource, and
that, if it contains all the materials one could ask for, the editor should
not be blamed for choosing an orientation quite different from the one
this reviewer suggests. After all, the instructor should be capable of
piecing a course together himself. Very few, I suppose, slavishly begin
at page one and follow the path without wandering. Furthermore, as-
signed reading outside the covers of the text is still considered fair
game. However, if what has been said so far about topics, text, cases,
and organization has any merit, then the structure of the book and
the focus of the editorial comments may be significant. This is espe-
cially so if the student is expected to garner a good deal of education
outside the classroom by working through series of problems to develop
points made by the principal cases and the instructor.
At the time of this writing the book° has not been available for
testing in the classroom. The following evaluation, therefore, is based
upon a reading of the cases and text, and upon a working-through of
numerous textual questions and problems. Evaluating classroom mate-
rials in such a context does have its inherent flaws; but, by analyzing
this book in light of the thoughts developed in preceding pages, some
worthwhile comments should be possible.
A. The Boundaries: Topics, Method, and Context
The broad coverage of "Contracts Dealing with Personalty,
Realty and Services" indicated in the book's title is as well intentioned
as it is accomplished. First, according to Professor Peters, "[t]his
expanded coverage mirrors the range and diversity of those recurrent,
non-donative, non-familial relationships which can be denominated
mercantile or commercial contracts. . . . A general exploration of the
many mercantile contracts with which the Code deals only in part .. .
provides a more total picture of the law of commercial transactions!'"
Second, but at least equally important, "a proper grasp of the precise
impact of the Code on particular transactions [is] enormously en-
riched by a consideration of alternate policies which govern non-Code
transactions."" Perhaps because the materials do generally fulfill these
45
 The copy used for this review was a collection of page-proofs, courtesy of
Mr. James Gillespie of the Bobbs-Merrill Company. Because not all of the major and
minor topic headings had been finally established in these proofs, I refrain from com-
menting on such matters here. Hereinafter the casebook will be cited as Peters.
There is an additional item which ought to be disclosed. My initial education in
Commercial Law was largely at Professor Peters' hand, and it included the study of por-
tions of these materials in their prepublication draft form. While this has given me some
feel for the text from the students' point of view, it is occasionally difficult for me to
assess where in my approach to the subject Professor Peters' bias ends and my own begins.
45 Peters at V.
47 Id. at vi.
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objectives, the text does not often impose topical limitations upon
those using it.
The Sales materials, for example, provide ample coverage of
performance and remedies for breach of contracts relating to realty and
services, as well as goods. Brief analyses of arbitration and the impact
of commercial insurance are smoothly integrated into the mainstream
of the text." Quality" and delivery requirements are exceptionally
well treated. The one omission" is, I think, forgivable: Professor
Peters has chosen to treat the Code's rules on contract formation with
a single swift stroke," apparently on the assumption that such things
are (or should be) covered in the basic Contracts course. To what
extent that assumption is true is, of course, nearly impossible to deter-
mine. However, because issues in parol evidence, modifications, and
waivers do arise in regard to the contract of sale," the investment of a
small amount of time in such things—even at the risk of repeating the
already-learned--is probably worthwhile; a recent case or two to help
that process would have been appreciated.
The chapters on Security are at least as thorough" as those on
Sales. All of the usual, but indispensable, topics (creation, validation,
perfection, enforcement, priorities, and liquidation) are here, with
a healthy dose of bankruptcy throughout. There are, in addition,
discussions of real estate security, multistate transactions, title cer-
tificate acts, bulk sales and tax liens, plus a long section on debtor's
defenses." It is with respect to the latter that one criticism could be
made: the materials on consumer protection are occasionally incom-
plete," although arguably sufficient for a course in which the focus
is the entire distributive chain rather than merely its presently most
popular part.
48 One minor qualification is that additional text on the scope and nature of com-
mercial insurance would be helpful.
49 The warranty section is notable in particular, although the materials on realty are
a bit lengthy. Id. at 297-344. The chattel warranty cases (Henningsen, Kollsman Instru-
ment Corp., Seely, and Neville v. Union Carbide) will integrate the warranty materials
with the preceding discussions on damages. Following two notes (Privity and Disclaimers)
is a selection of tobacco and drug cases. See Peters at 344-534.
5° See discussion of topics at pp' 193-95 supra.
51 Peters, at 2: "The Code on the one hand broadly incorporates consistent prin-
ciples of general contract law, in Section 1-103, while on the other band it establishes
specific contract rules on such general subjects as offer and acceptance, and uncon-
scionability, in Sections 2-201-210 and Sections 2-301 and 2-302." Cf. note 52 infra.
52 At such points Professor Peters does mention these issues, but usually in very
abbreviated fashion. E.g., Peters at 445 (re express disclaimers of warranty): "All of
this requires a determination of when the sale was in fact made often an intrinsically
difficult inquiry whose complexities are only increased by U.C.C. i§ 2-207 to 2-209." See
also, id. at 37 ("Where are, of course, waiver sections. .. ."), 444, 524.
53 Again, by reference to the preceding discussion, at p. 194 supra.
u Peters at 1177-1284. But see note 55 infra.
55 While the Massachusetts Consumer Finance statutes are reprinted in 30 pages
(1249-78), in the same section the U.C.C.C. is accorded 2 pages, the NCA none, and the
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The Payment materials include,'" in addition to the "normal"
contractual obligations of payment, an extended treatment of bankers'
commercial credits'? and documentary transactions, and notes on the
relationship between payment methods and inspection rights. The
materials for those particular items are ample, although the instructor
who feels the need to incorporate a study of credit cards and other
noncash payment systems will need to do a bit of supplementing.
Two obvious exclusions" here are Negotiable Instruments and
Bank Deposits and Collections. The use of the word "exclusions"
needs some qualification; while features of negotiable instruments
law are interspersed throughout the book to "round out" discussions
of payment and financing, for example, the bulk of the material is
collected in a forty-one page "Negotiable Instruments Primer."'" In
this cogently written mini-hornbook is contained text designed to arm
the student for his joust with the balance of the materials; but as Pro-
fessor Peters notes, "it will not, of course, be a substitute for a full-scale
course in negotiable instruments, and will hardly touch on the com-,
plexities of banking law.. . .""
It is with this objective, more so than with the materials them-
selves, that one could take issue. Why, .after considering instruments
in their functional context, any "full-scale course" should be necessary,,
I do not understand. There may be peculiarities in the world of bills
and notes worthy of further treatment; but if their operation in situ
is adequately explored, justification of an additional, separate course
is doubtful. Short-term commercial paper, after all, is merely a means
by which the ends of financing and payment are accomplished. If
enough is studied to demonstrate how those tasks are performed, there
Federal Consumer Protection Act 4. Id. at 1248 et seq. The bibliography, however, is,
as elsewhere in the book, excellent. Id. at 1283-84, 1245-49.
A similar comment could be made about "unconsdonability." It is dealt with
primarily in the financing context. Id. at 1189 (In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., defenses to
the secured transaction), and 1299 (Williams v. Walker-Thomas, re repossessions). But
it is left dangerously open-ended at several other points, e.g., at 1205. The discussion of
2-302 as a limit on credit costs is appropriate at that point, but unfortunately brief.
Students who have not been forced to analyze § 2-302 rigorously often tend to clutch it
with a panacean grasp. Further textual development could prevent such a potential diver-
sion. The instructor who prefers to take his § 2-302 in larger doses could easily add to these
cases the discussion of the warranty materials, especially the Henning= case, at 353, and
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, at 67.
50 Peters, Chapter 3: "The Obligations of the Vendee for Payment," at 595-733.
The chapter begins with three sections on "The Normal Incidence of the Obligation to
Pay," "Contractual Modifications," and "Excused Nonpayment."
57 Id. at 670-734.
58 See discussion of topics, at pp. 194-95 supra.
5 Peters at 1411-51. The introduction to the Primer states, "Mlle purpose of this
chapter is to provide basic information about negotiable instruments for students of
commercial law. The chapter is designed as an introduction into the terminology, method-
ology and mystique of the law of .. 'instruments' . It should enable you to under-
stand the negotiable paper counterparts to the variety of commercial transactions
discussed elsewhere in this casebook." Id. at 1411.
60 Id.
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would seem to be little else to say. Professor Peters has chosen here
a middle road between fully integrating and totally segregating this
important area. As a result, the student could possibly fail to fully
appreciate the workings of the Article 3 machinery, thus not totally
understanding its function in context. The high quality of the "Primer"
will remedy a good deal of this, but the instructor who chooses to com-
pletely integrate his courses should be prepared to make more extended
in-class digressions into Negotiable Instruments than the notes in the
remainder of the casebook would suggest."
Topics in Distribution, including documentary deals (contracts
of carriage and of bailment), are covered "wherever relevant," 02 and
quite well at that. That is not, however, the case as regards dealer-
ships and franchise arrangements. At least some mention of the latter
should be made in the basic commercial law course, for several reasons.
First is the magnitude of the share of commerce currently being done
by franchise networks. 68
 Secondly, and although much of the current
discussion in franchising is concerned with Antitrust and Securities
Regulation, a franchise contract will typically moot a good deal of
the U.C.C. scheme; the same is true of other types of dealership ar-
rangements." Franchising is one of those areas in which the form of
the enterprise does affect what may be nominally called the "commer-
cial transaction."
As have many of her predecessors, Professor Peters has left
much of commercial law method for tacit development. Five and one-
61 There is no similar replacement for the nearly total—but more justifiable—ex-
clusion of bank deposits and collections. Supplementary materials in this area are readily
available. See, e.g., B. Clark and A. Squillante, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections,
and Credit Cards (1970).
02 As, for example, with respect to delivery requirements, see Peters at 589-94; pay-
ment, at 670; reclamation of goods, at 810-18; and security, at 870-92.
oa See, Axelrad, Franchising—Changing Legal Skirmish Lines or Armageddon? Some
Observations from the Foxhole, 26 Bus. Lawyer 695 (1971): "The growth in revenues
attributed to this form of distribution has increased by 3600% in the past 15 years."
Id. at 695. Currently, franchising accounts for over $100 billion in retail sales annually,
or marketing control over approximately 10% of the Gross National Product. U.S.
Commerce Department News, Jan. 31, 1970 (address by Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce Kenneth N. Davis); see also, The Impact of Franchising on Small Business, Hear-
ings before the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970). While covering franchising
in a separate seminar in the curriculum may some day come to pass, at present the com-
mercial law courses seem well adapted to at least introducing the student to a phenom-
enon which
appears to be growing at an almost unbelievable rate. It has been called a cradle-
to-the-grave industry. I have found that you can literally outfit your baby or
buy a coffin at a franchised outlet. You can rent a snowplow, buy a bridal
gown, get fitted for a bra, or hire a private detective from your 'neighborhood
franchisee.'
Id. at 1 (remarks of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr.).
64 Professor Peters' materials do cover modification of remedy by contract generally,
Peters at 230-96, but they do not adequately treat the special problems in this increasingly
important segment of trade.
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half pages constitute the only express treatments of commercial
history and methodology." Yet, this is not to say that such a choice is
necessarily in error. The instructor who carefully works his class
through the one illustrative problem" will have at least alerted his
charges to the fact that there is such a thing as code analysis; if he
keeps at it throughout the first course in commercial law he will
probably have accomplished a good 'deal. While I personally would
prefer to have seen a more extended discussion of commercial law
history, and especially of code and statutory interpretation, I have
to agree that at least the latter can be well taught by running pre-Code
cases through the statutory maze, or by in-class discussion of hypo-
thetical problems designed to expose the U.C.C.'s crevices." This
more-or-less tacit development of analytical skill seems especially
fruitful with respect to the integration of extra-Code law into the
statutory scheme." At junctures where opportunities for such discus-
sion are not inherent within the topic, Professor Peters has artfully
created them." The result, of course, is that those who prefer teaching
analytical method inductively may continue to do so; those who do
not may expressly interject these considerations in class. Perhaps the
only advantage to a more explicit coverage of method in the casebook,
including the uses of non-Code matter, is to impress the student with
its importance—a task probably as readily accomplished during class
time.
I am somewhat less sanguine about the relative omission of "gap-
fillers"—the residual or "supereminent" provisions which can form
so integral a part of commercial lawyering." Discussion of U.C.C.
Section 1-205, for example, is limited to one brief reference in the
Negotiable Instruments Primer,71 and commercial "good faith" is
explored only tangentially in all but one instance." Certainly the
juridical importance of these concepts (both theoretically and prag-
matically) justifies a deeper probing; law-predicting without an appre-
ciation of the nature of these flexion joints is simply too risky.
65 Id. at 1-6.
66 Actually, the problem is a series of questions concerning the Statute of Frauds,
which illustrates the need for constant cross-referencing and precise statutory reading as
well as the Code's gaps and ambiguities. Id. at 5-6.
67 See text at p. 200 supra.
68 A sampling could include: the relationship between the U.C.C. sections on war-
ranty and the larger world of Tort. Peters, at 477, 511, 523; also Peters at 527 on the
meaning of "defective" mechanics' and artisans' liens, id. at 1341, 1352, and title cer-
tificate acts, id. at 862-70, 1014.
69 See, for example, the materials on Letters of Credit, 730-33, and Documents of
Title, 870-88. The references, however, are not always self-instructive; in-class guidance
seems to have been intended at a few points.` See Chapter 3, § B, especially at 638;
compare pages 39-43.
70 See text at pp. 197-98 supra.
71 Peters at 1443.
72 A series of five problems are cited in the section on competing claimants. Id, at
765. The same is true of § 1-102(2) (b), noted only by way of footnote to a principal
case. Id, at 712.
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That most of the analytical considerations are adequately treated
is the result of Professor Peters' truly first-rate handling of cases,
problems, and text." Those few areas which could have stood further
development can be traced to the book's relative deemphasis of the
commercial context.
The treatment of the business context is not uniform throughout
the book. At some points there is explanatory material," but at others
these items are left to extrapolation from the principal cases.' This
involves a degree of risk that coverage will be a hit-or-miss affair; and,
in fact, there are a few instances where a "miss" occurs. 70 Having
correctly decided that text-writing and spoon-feeding are not synon-
omous, it is surprising that the author did not everywhere expand the
notes to include discussion of these rather important?"' matters. The
inclusion of a few forms or several more prototypes could have
aided "cognitive level" comprehension without compromising other
objectives."
In this respect, the book is subject to two criticisms. First, the
deemphasis of the commercial context leads to the relative elision79
of one segment of the U.C.C.'s internal methodology, namely, the
potentially valuable use of certain of the "supereminent" and in-
terpretive provisions of the Code." If it is true that objectified com-
73 See discussion at pp. 209-11 infra.
74 Id. at 132, 139. A case on the recovery of overhead as damages is followed by a
rather good note on the business treatment of "accounting costs." Id. at 23 (factual
background of principal case).
75 Some of the principal cases do lend themselves to such extrapolations, e.g., id. at
237-46; others, much less so, id. at 1337-41. Certain portions of the text are similarly
incomplete when it comes to integrating doctrine with mercantile exigencies. Id. at 267-
75.
76
 An example is the treatment of bulk sales, id. at 898-903, 908-11. While the
problems and text do an excellent job of introducing the statutory provisions, the task
of exploring the commercial setting is left to one reported case, which, while it does dis-
cuss certain aspects of the business context, is extremely abbreviated and somewhat
narrow 'for that purpose.
77 See discussion of the significance of commercial context at pp. 198-99 supra.
78
 At some points the omission seems intentional, Professor Peters apparently opting
in favor of the student's developing for himself the answer to such questions as "What
are the commercial advantages and contra-indications to the use of X type of paper?"
See, for instance, Peters, at 593-94: "Ordinarily the documents are tendered for accept-
ance and payment long before the goods could be expected to arrive. . . . This implies,
of course, that the documents should be negotiable in form; nonnegotiable documents
are uninstitutionaI in this kind of contract, and create innumerable problems" (emphasis
added). The preceding materials (pages 589-593) do certainly "describe" the legal inci-
dents of documents of title, but they explain the "why" of the underscored statement
only to the student who carefully works his way through most of the prior code refer-
ences, and who looks ahead to a couple of cases dealing with this matter (page 873).
As a result, the conscientious student may attain an intellectual framework for under-
standing the quoted sentence, and that, it seems, was the author's purpose. My query is
whether this acquired knowledge could not be made more apparent.
7° Noted at p. 207 supra.
80
 Discussed at notes 26 and 27 supra.
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mercial practice becomes the norm of decision," then the importance
of appreciating the "commercially usual" is difficult to overemphasize.
The second point is considerably less important, and may only be a
matter of pedagogical style: while explication of the business back-
ground is indeed possible within the covers of the book, it is not
always apparent. The instructor who deems such matters important
will have to devote some class time to setting the commercial stage.
B. Materials: Cases, Problems and Text
Organizing the materials in an eminently teachable fashion is
without question the highlight of this book. It is, in fact, so well
done that many of the criticisms previously mentioned are more easily
repaired than would otherwise be possible. The system is used with
minor variations from the first chapter to the next-to-last," with
deviations from the pattern apparently dictated most often by the
subject matter. An example or two should suffice to describe the struc-
ture.
In discussing the right of the buyer to refuse goods tendered him
by the seller" (i.e., to "call the deal off"), the section begins with
an extended quotation from Corbin on the relationships among restitu-
tion, rescission, and damages." The apparent function here is to set the
doctrinal and analytical background of the materials that follow, and
to do so in sufficient breadth to provide a juridical context for those
more particular issues. What follows are two pre-Code cases: the
first" explores in greater detail a portion of the issues raised in the
preceding note, and provides a factual setting for class discussion
of the policy referents behind them. The second" is designed for a
similar end, but is concerned with matters presently in the ambit
of the commercial statutes. The factual setting of this second prin-
ciple case is elaborated in a short note, including a sketch of the
transaction from its beginning through to litigation. A Code case"
of recent vintage (and of relatively frequent factual occurrence) then
displays judicial application of the U.C.C. to several problems within
the general subject.
Textual material by the author, liberally furnished with case and
article citations, covers the historical development of the rejection rules
from their judicial origins, through the Uniform Sales Act and into
the numerous aspects of the twentieth century cases. Some of these
cases are then considered in light of the contemporary statutes. The
method here is to posit questions and make references to relevant sec-
81 See text p. 198 and notes 29-32 supra.
82 The final chapter comprises the "Negotiable Instruments Primer."
88 Peters at 7-44.
84 5 A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 1104-06 (1951).
85 Village of Wells v. Layne-Minnesota Co., 240 Minn. 132, 60 N.W.2d 621 (1953).
88 Alper Blouse Co. v. E.E. Connor & Co., 2 N.Y.2d 281, 140 N.E.2d 358, 159
N.Y.S.2d 481 (1957).
87 Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
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tions of the U.C.C. The questions are sometimes those of decided cases
and frequently are designed solely to introduce the careful reader to
nuances of the statutory scheme. Comparisons with analogous rights of
the seller, with installment contracts, and with non-U.C.C. transactions
are handled in a similar fashion. Finally, a well-selected bibliography
of supplemental reading is provided.
Common variations from this design include the substitution of
early cases for text on the historical perspective," or of more extended
hypothetical situations to illuminate the statutory scheme. 8° Thus,
with each segment of material the student is first introduced to the his-
torical and doctrinal setting of the matters in point—a task normally
best performed without the inevitable skewing which occurs when
exclusive reliance is placed on appellate cases. Following the textual
introduction, reported opinions are used to demonstrate to the student
the need for reaching a decision, and to uncover the economic and
societal referents which underlie both the broad legal context and the
microcosmic process of decision-making. Through the inclusion of
cases involving fact patterns governed by the commercial statutes, a
critical evaluation of the U.C.C. scheme (and an appreciation derived
from applying it to the case) is made possible. Additional "doctrine"
as well as method is presented by Code cases.
Hypothetical problems, questions and references are used not
merely to inform, but to aid the student in dealing with the statutes,
evaluating alternatives and reaching conclusions." To have employed
reported opinions sufficient to encompass alI the nuances of "doctrine"
and analysis to which the student is exposed through these "notes"
would have been to waste uncounted pages of text, to say nothing
of time.° 1 Needless to say, the orchestration of the materials employed
in the book successfully avoids the dangers of the monolithic approach
88 E.g., the materials on risk of loss, Peters at 166 et seq.
89 Id. at 97-98; cf. materials on quality requirements at 351-52, where the questions
nearly form a practitioner's checklist. See also 670-733 on banker's credits.
98 Some of the "problems" inevitably are better than others, although the quality
overall is exceptionally high. Again, this may be only a matter of personal predeliction.
Occasionally questions are posed at a level which merely informs, rather than develops,
analytical style. See Peters at 95. In other places, citations seem to be offered only as a
resource; no spur to real study is presented. Id. at 178-79. Such occurrences are in-
frequent, and when they do appear the issues in question are more rigorously explored
in other sections of the materials.
91 Again, at the risk of being unreasonably critical, I should add that there are
places in the book where the balance of text and case is not perfect. Moore v. Bay (id.
at 942) might have been relegated to text, for instance, while more case (or problem)
material could have been added to the section on defective filings. Id. at 913-51. Similarly,
the cases on Dominion at 1116-76 are too many except for the contribution they make
to an understanding of business practices. On the other hand, too many issues in
liquidation of the security interest are left to "note" treatment. Id. at 1331-36. Finally,
the cases on chattel paper and dealer financing seem incomplete without some text on
"floor-planning" systems, and perhaps a bit of history concerning trust receipts at this
point. Id. at 1337-41.
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already discussed." The background text serves to lead the student
more quickly to the core of the issues in question, usually with some
awareness of the factual context in which the problem arose. The note
materials and their hypothetical questions plunge deeply, if on occasion
tacitly, into policy, doctrine, and commercial law method. A basically
chronological development illuminates not only the historical dimen-
sions, but provides a sense of evolution—a picture of law as process.
And, throughout, the abstract is made usable in the reported cases.
While Professor Peters' system may not be fully self-teaching,
even one teaching commercial law for the first time could not go far
wrong by adhering to the pattern of this casebook.
C. Topical Orientation
By way of overview, the topical orientation of these materials is
chameleon; it is as well suited to the transactional approach as it is to
the functional or strictly topical methods. Throughout the book the
central theme of distribution of goods is integrated with analagous
issues in realty and services,' but in such a way as to preserve, rather
than disrupt, continuity. There is no point at which the reader is with-
out an appreciation of his place within the "flow" of commercial law.
The integration of Sales and Security, for example, is done in
two ways, allowing the instructor a broad range of freedom to mesh
these two major areas. At a few relevant points within the Sales
materials are references to the security aspects of the transaction."
But the greatest bulk of the integration occurs in Chapter Four"—
a study of the need for secured transactions in the light of competing
claims of ownership in sold goods. That chapter serves admirably the
function of relating these two areas, and, for a nonintegrated course,
it could be either the conclusion of the Sales Division, or the beginning
of Security."
52 Whether Professor Peters arranged her materials to achieve objectives similar
to those discussed elsewhere in this review, I cannot say. I comment on it here only to
indicate how well the book accords with those criteria.
93 See pp. 199-201 supra. See, for example, the section on quality obligations,
Peters at 297-594.
54 Id. at 273-75, 579, 594.
55 Id. at 763-70, 820.
55 For nonintegrated use, I would reverse § B ("The Continuing Rights of Prior
Ownership Interests") and § A ("Competing Purchasers and Creditors") of Chapter 4,
since the reclamation cases are more closely associated with the preceding materials on
payment; looking first to the issues of seller or lender in possession is somewhat dis-
ruptive if only Chapters I through IV are being covered. The order is less important for
the continuing course, since both financing aspects (purchases and production) are
transactionally significant, and should—as they are in Chapters V through VII—be con-
sidered simultaneously.
As an aside, the inclusion of the Kravitz case at p. 829 of this chapter—while argu-
ably appropriate—may have been forgone in favor of other uses of this delightful journey
into statutory pathology. It could be better used in either Chapter 5 § A on bankruptcy,
or very early on in the materials as an example of the U.C.C.'s interaction with other
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On another plane, Professor Peters has managed to avoid the
pitfalls of both superficial reference and disruptive digression, insofar
as incorporating Negotiable Instruments and Documents of Title
is concerned. Both types of commercial paper are considered when-
ever relevant," the areas in which they overlap are not unnecessarily
duplicated," and their inclusion seldom requires excessive digression
to make the point.' The salutary result is in part due to the Negotiable
Instruments Primer, but equally to the level of craftmanship with
which Articles 3 and 7 are referenced into the mainstream of the
book. Although tangential treatment of corporate finance is lacking,
the integration of other matters peripheral to chattel security (but
necessary for a complete picture of security transactions in general)
is well done.'" Finally, realistic use of text and copious questions and
references to the U.C.C. all contribute to solving the problems which
arise when simultaneous study of two "topics" is needed to appreciate
a given point.'"
While whatever predelictions the instructor may have for orga-
nizing the multitopic course can find fulfillment here, the book is
remarkably well suited to the "transactional'"" ordering in particular.
In addition to fundamental matters such as the sequence of chapters
and sections, the approach is largely a function of the material between
the cases. The constant and close cross-referencing, and the use of "by
the way . . ." notes and text introduce the proper elements at the
proper moments without upsetting the overall current.
III. CONCLUSION
Within the pages of this book Professor Peters has set out but
a brief sketch of the purposes she had in mind in producing it.'"
Measured in terms of those few statements, it is an unqualified suc-
cess. The expanded coverage of transactions both within and beyond
the reach of the U.C.C. is fashioned in a way nearly certain to pro-
bodies of Iaw. But its present location is not harmful and the instructor could easily
make these other connections without much difficulty.
97 A brief check disclosed the following; Documents: Peters at 589-92 (delivery and
payment) ; at 662, 732 (inspection rights, letters of credit); at 809, 818, 870-87, 891-92
(third party interests), Instruments: at 275 (modification of remedy, payment) ; 1213,
1217, 1221-22, 1245 (effects in security transactions) ; 584-85 (warranties of sale of
"contract rights") ; 652-57 (effect on breach, payment); 777, 818-19, 855 (competing
claimants.)
99
 Id. at 818.
99
 Although, as noted at pp. 205-06 supra, more is bound to he required in some cases
than the notes suggest.
loo See, for example, the treatment of Bulk Sales at 898-91; Bailments at 870-88;
Government Contracts at 971-73, 788-806; Bankruptcy throughout Chapters 5 and 6;
"Consumership" at 1229, inter alia; Suretyship at 798-806, 1357-62; and other com-
petitors to the collateral at 1354-57.
101 See p. 202 supra.
102 See discussion at pp. 201-02 supra.
193
 See quotations from the Preface, and from the Introduction to the Negotiable
Instruments Primer, cited at pp. 203, 205 supra, and at note 59 supra.
212
BOOK REVIEW
vide both a broad sweep of doctrine and an opportunity for critically
assessing the policy choices of the Code. In addition, the text and
notes on commercial paper are more than adequate to introduce the
student to the "mystique" of the laW of instruments.
The virtues of the book, howevei, go well beyond these expressed
concerns. It is a resource every commercial law instructor would do
well to consider—and to adopt. For even the fully integrated course
or sequence, supplementing should be,necessary only to flesh out bank
collection systems,'" or some recent "consumer" issues, if time
allows."' Nothing need be added or changed so far as the use of cases,
text and problems is concerned. While the question and problem mate-
rials occasionally seem too difficult to be self-teaching at the early
stages, that may be a strength more than it is a weakness. A class
that can be induced to give the notes the careful study they deserve
will reap dividends well in excess of those attainable through less
rigorous devices.
The few significant criticisms, I think, pertain to what the book
could have included, rather than to what it does. I refer here to the
treatment of commercial contexts and their implications for the tech-
niques of commercial , lawyering. There are, perhaps, two mitigating
factors: one is that the instructor could himself supply such data
at those few points where the text does not; 1" the other is that it
is possible to extrapolate a good deal (but not always all) of the
business setting from the principal cases. But in either event, some
class time which could otherwise have been saved will have to be
devoted to these matters. On the next level, this exclusion may make a
thorough study of the impact of business practices on the lawyering
process a bit more difficult, although I must admit that devotion of a
not unreasonable amount of pedagogy—together with a well-used copy
of the U.C.C.—could satisfy even the most avid student of Code
method.
I have attempted to evaluate this book by comparing it to a
rather specific and perhaps overly personalized set of standards. This
type of evaluation has proved necessary in order to accomplish more
than merely heaping praise on what is generally an excellent work.
Statements such as "this part is good," or "that part is not so good,"
104 The
 references to Article 4 (Peters at 584, 716-20, 732, passim within
Chapter 8) do not portray the flow of payments through banking channels in a suffi-
ciently inclusive manner. Professor Peters, of course, never intended that they should.
There is, however, time in 100 class hours to complete the distributive sytem by taking
up this topic.
1°6 This is especially so in regard to credit cards. The other topical omissions (se-
lected issues in corporate finance and commercial paper financing) could be treated with-
out supplementary materials, although a pedantic impulse to the contrary may be more
temptation than I can resist. Less impelling is the urge to distribute sample forms of
documents, or to assign collateral readings in commercial law history, for here the case-
book provides at least the openings for classroom presentation.
106 Discussed at pp. 208-09 supra.
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are based on those criteria; the instructor who disagrees with my
premises should keep this fact in mind. Finally, if certain of my criti-
cisms have seemed unduly querulous, this may only be due to the
eagerness with which I met the publication of these materials. My
anticipation has been justified. Ellen Peters' casebook is a profoundly
valuable contribution to the teaching of Commercial Law.
EDWARD A. DAUER*
* AM., Brown University, 1966; LL.B. Yale University, 1969; Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.
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